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Most theories of involuntary unemployment predict that the equi-
librium wage in the labor market will be greater than the reservation
wage of the unemployed. These theories concentrate on explaining
why the labor market does not clear, with the market wage falling
to the level of the reservation wage, as predicted by the classical
paradigm. Relatively little, however, has been said about the be-
havior of reservation wages. This paper seeks to ¯ll the gap in the
literature. We look at the empirical determinants of the reservation
wage and suggest what this implies for the evolution of the natural
rate of unemployment.
¤I would like to thank Olivier Blanchard and Colm Harmon for their very helpful
comments on an earlier draft of this paper. Email abuse to vincent.hogan@ucd.ie
yThe data used in this paper were made available through the ESRC Data Archive.
The data were originally collected by the ESRC Research Centre on Micro-social Change
at the University of Essex. Neither the original collectors of the data nor the Archive bear
any responsibility for the analyses or interpretations presented here.
11 Introduction
In all models of the labour market, the reservation wage |the wage that
makes workers indi®erent between taking a job or remaining unemployed|
is a central determinant of the actual wage, and in turn, of the unemploy-
ment rate. In competitive models, the actual wage is simply equal to the
reservation wage. In models with bargaining or e±ciency wages, the actual
wage is a markup on the reservation wage, the size of the markup being de-
termined by the structure of the labour market. The purpose of this paper
is to explore empirically the determinants of the reservation wage, and draw
out the implications of our ¯ndings for wage determination and the natural
rate of unemployment.
The standard way of thinking about the reservation wage is as follows.
Unemployed workers face a wage distribution, which depends on their ob-
servable and unobservable (to the econometrician, not to employers) char-
acteristics. The rate at which they get job o®ers depends on labour market
conditions. While waiting or searching for o®ers, workers draw down assets,
receive unemployment and other bene¯ts, and may get utility from leisure.
In this standard model, the past does not directly matter. More formally,
once we control for the wage distribution, unemployment bene¯ts etc., the
wage that workers received in the previous job should be irrelevant.
It is easy to conceive, however, of reasons why this might not be the case
i.e. reasons why previous wages might a®ect reservation wages, above and
beyond what they may reveal about the characteristics of the workers. For
example, workers may view the previous wage as the best indicator of their
value to a potential employer. Thus they could simply set their reservation
wage to equal the wage received in a previous job. Another reason is pride.
Even if it is unrealistic to expect re-employment at the previous wage, it
could be very di±cult for an unemployed worker to accept anything less.
With these issues in mind, we specify the reservation wage as a function
not only of the relevant distribution of wages, labour market conditions,
and unemployment bene¯ts, but also of the wage received in the previous
job. We estimate this relation using the British Household Panel Survey
over six years (1991-97). This data set contains explicit information about
reservation wages, labour market status, previous wages, and can be used to
construct a mean wage based on observable characteristics of each worker.
The main econometric challenge is to disentangle whether the coe±cient
on the previous wage re°ects causality, or the fact that the previous wage
2contains information about the unobservable characteristics of workers. We
do so through use of the panel dimension of our data.
Our empirical conclusions are clear, and appear robust to a number of
alternative speci¯cations and econometric treatments. We ¯nd a signi¯cant,
but|to our surprise| a relatively small e®ect of the previous wage on the
reservation wage. An increase in the previous wage of 10% increases the
reservation wage by between 1:5%. We ¯nd a large and signi¯cant e®ect of
the mean of the distribution of wages on the reservation wage (an elasticity
of 0:3). We also ¯nd a signi¯cant but very small e®ect of unemployment
bene¯ts (an elasticity of 0:015). One other surprising result is that the e®ect
oflabour market conditions (local or individual speci¯c unemployment rates)
onthe reservation wage, is small (elasticity of ¡0:1), and insome regressions,
statistically insigni¯cant.
These results have interesting macroeconomic implications, because the
reservation wage in part determines the natural rate of unemployment. Were
it the case that the coe±cient on the previous wage was close to unity, reser-
vation wages would be largely a function of the past. If we think of the
market wage as being a mark up on the reservation wage, we would expect
to see it following an autoregressive process with close to a unit root. Thus,
changes in policy could have permanent (or at least long lasting) e®ects on
wages and unemployment. One can imagine, for example, a negative terms
of trade shock that shifts the mean of the distribution of wage o®ers down.
But the unemployed, remembering what times were like before the shock,
refuse to adjust to reality (i.e. the reservation wage is more in°uenced by the
previous wage than by the mean of the current wage distribution). In e®ect
the unemployed price themselves out of a job. Unemployment will persist
for as long as it takes for their expectations to adjust to the new reality.
Our results suggest that the reservation wage (and therefore unemploy-
ment) will adjust to any shock relatively quickly. The coe±cients on the
main variable that re°ects current reality, the expected future wage is bigger
than the coe±cient on the historic variable, the wage in the previous job.
Furthermore the coe±cient on the previous wage is much less than unity.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 gives a brief outline of a
simple generic model of involuntary unemployment. We use this model to
illustrate the importance ofreservationwage formation forevolution ofwages
and unemployment. We also discuss the existing empirical evidence. Section
three discusses issues of econometric speci¯cation. Section four discusses the
data. Section ¯ve presents the results. Section six concludes.
32 Macroeconomic Implications of Reservation
Wages
2.1 A Generic Model of Involuntary Unemployment
While theories of the determination of the natural rate of unemployment and
equilibrium real wages are many and diverse, most of them can be accommo-
dated within a simple theoretical framework that is a generalization of the
standard competitive supply and demand model.1 The ¯rst relation, equa-
tion (1), is basically a standard labour demand curve (although it is usually
expressed as an inverse demand curve). It states that the real wage that a
¯rm pays (W ) is increasing in productivity of labour (A) and other factors
that a®ect the demand for labour (Xd).2
W = Af(Xd) (1)
Equation (2) is the \wage setting equation". It is a generalised version of
(inverse) labour supply curve that allows for involuntary unemployment. It
states that the real after tax wage demanded by the worker, W(1 ¡ ¿), is
markup on WR, the real reservation wage (the worker's outside option). The
markup, B, is a function of unemployment and Xs; a vector of variables that
a®ect the workers' negotiating power.
W(1¡ ¿) = W
RB(u;Xs) (2)
The wage setting relation includes the competitive labour supply curve as a
special case with W = WR and zero involuntary unemployment in equilib-
rium. But most economists would see this as unrealistic, agreeing that there
is some ine±ciency in the labour market that prevents it from clearing in
a classical fashion i.e. to the point where workers reservation wage equals
the value of the marginal productivity of their labour to ¯rms. The precise
nature of the market failure determines the function B.
The presence of some ine±ciency implies that, in equilibrium, there are
unexploited rents to employment. Workers are able to appropriate a share of
these rents and receive a wage in excess of their reservation wage. In general,
1See for example, Bean (1994), Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991) and Blanchard and
Katz (1997). Indeed this framework has become so ubiquitous that it has recently been
incorporated into an undergraduate text (see Blanchard, 1997).
2For clarity, it is convenient, but not necessary, to assume Harrod neutral technology.
4as the unemployment rate rises, workers' negotiating position worsens and
the markup over the reservation wage falls i.e. Bu < 0.3
Equilibrium in the labour market is jointly determined by the interaction
of both relations, with the natural rate of unemployment being de¯ned im-
plicitly.4 Note that unemployment is involuntary in a precise sense: in equi-
librium, workers would be willing to accept any job o®er paying the market
wage rate, as it is greater than their reservation wage rate, (W > WR); but
employers are unwilling to make the o®er because of some market failure.
For example, in a search model, such as Pissarides (1990) the market
failure is the inability of ¯rms and workers to form matches instantaneously.
This results in a stock of unemployed workers even while some jobs remain
un¯lled. Firms are prepared to pay more than the reservation wage in order
to avoid the cost ofcontinuedsearch. In this case B is an increasing function
of unemployment and a decreasing function of the stock of un¯lled vacan-
cies. In the case of the e±ciency wage models, such as Shapiro & Stiglitz
(1984), market failure occurs because ¯rms cannot observe workers' produc-
tivity costlessly. Firms pay above the reservation wage in order motivate
workers. The premium declines as unemployment rises, Bu < 0, because
higher unemployment acts as a motivating device.
2.2 The E®ect of Shocks
Most research, both theoretical and empirical, has focused on nature of the
market failure that generates involuntary unemployment i.e. the function
B in our model. Other aspects of the model - for example the reservation
wage - have typically not been analyzed in any great detail. In this paper
we invert this logic, focusing our attention on the nature and determinants
of reservation wage and remaining agnostic about the nature of the markup
function (and therefore about the exact cause of involuntary unemployment).
The reason for this focus is that, as Blanchard and Katz (1997) show,
the determination of the reservation wage has crucial implications for the
adjustment of the macro-economy to shocks. In order to illustrate the point,
consider the impact on the natural rate of an increase in ¿, the tax on wage
3If ¯rms and workers split the rents equally, then the wage will be given by (2). More
sophisticated negotiating structures do not a®ect the basic implications of the model. See
Layard et. al. (1991) for a discussion.
4u¤ is the natural rate de¯ned by B(u¤;Xs) =
(1 ¡ ¿)Af(Xd)
W R
5income. (The following intuition will work just as well with a productivity
shock or a terms of trade shock). Intuitively, if the burden of the taxes falls
entirely on the workers, then the cost of labour does not rise and the tax
has no implications for unemployment.5 Workers, seeking to preserve the
markup of net wage on the ¯xed reservation wage, shift some of the burden
of taxes onto employers in the form of a higher gross wage. Firms respond
to an increase in the cost of labour by cutting back on hires.6
This holds for a ¯xed reservation wage. If, however, the reservation wage
itself changes in response to the tax, then the e®ect of the tax on the natural
rateof unemploymentturns out to bevery di®erent. Continuingthe example,
assumethat thereservationwage is completely determinedby unemployment
bene¯ts, b, and that these are taxable at the same rate as wage income,
then WR = (1 ¡ ¿)b: Substituting for WR in the wage setting equation (2)
results in an expression for the equilibrium wage (and unemployment) that
is independent of ¿. Thus taxes will have no e®ect on equilibrium wages or
unemployment, even in the short run. In this simplistic case the reservation
wage adjusts immediately and completely to the change in taxes and workers
bear the entire burden of the tax.
Inamore realisticcase, we mightexpectany adjustment inthe reservation
wage to take time. How long this adjustment takes will be an important
determinant of the long run response of unemployment to shocks.
Bean (1994) and Blanchard and Katz (1997) point out that we might
expect that the workers bear the entire burden of the tax in the very long
run. Continuing the example, suppose that an individual derives utility from
consumption(c)andleisure(l) accordingto the functionu(ct;lt) = lnct+lnlt.
In this context the reservation wage can be de¯ned as the marginal rate
of substitution of consumption for leisure and is given by the expression
WR = c=l. Suppose also that credit markets are such that the individual
can consume the annuity value of permanent income, so that ct is given by
ct = rY(1¡ ¿), where Y is permanent income, r is the discount rate and ¿
is the tax rate on permanent income. In this case the reservation wage will
5Of course, individuals whose after tax wage has fallen, may withdraw from the labour
force, leading to a fall in employment. These individuals, however, are not unemployed;
they are non-participants.
6We can easily see this by totally di®erentiating (2) or the expression for u¤ with respect
to ¿ while keeping W R ¯xed.






Substituting WR from (3) into (2) results in expressions for the gross
wage and for the natural rate of unemployment that is independent of the
tax rate. Real wages are not rigid. Any change in taxation will fall entirely
on the workers. Even a permanent increase in taxation will have no e®ect on
unemployment.
Of course this story only works to the extent that the Permanent Income
Hypothesis is true. But more importantly, it is also only true for the special
case where the reservation wage is given by the marginal rate of substitution
of consumption for leisure. There is still scope for taxes to have an impact
on unemployment if we allow for a more general de¯nition of the reservation
wage. In particular, assume that it re°ects, not just the value of leisure, but
workers aspirations also. As a simple, if extreme, example of this aspirations
scenario, suppose thatpride ensures that an unemployed individual will never
accept a job at a wage lower than the wage he received during a previous
period of employment. In this case the reservation wage would be given by
WR
t = Wt¡1: Substituting into equation (2) will generate
lnWt = lnB(u;v;X) +lnWt¡1¡ ln(1 ¡ ¿) (4)
The burden of the tax shifts entirely to ¯rms. More importantly, the wage
equation now has a unit root. Both these properties imply that increases
in taxation will have a permanent e®ect on wages and unemployment. In
this scenario the worker fails to adjust his aspirations to the new reality.
Following a tax increase (from zero to ¿), he still seeks the same after tax
wage as he had before, despite the fact that this wage is now economically
infeasible for the (marginal) employer. Unemployment results and will last
as long as aspirations fail to adjust to the new reality.
The analysis holds equally well for other shocks, such as a slowdown in
productivity growth. In the short run workers might seek to maintain living
standards (reservation wages remains unchanged) andunemployment results.
In the long run, however, we would expect that aspirations would adjust to
reality and unemployment return to its previous level. Precisely how long
7I am being sloppy here. Presumably the possibility of being unemployed would e®ect
the individual's permanent income as well as the de¯nition of the reservation wage. I
ignore these complications in order to illustrate the basic point.
7this adjustment takes depends on the extent to which reservation wages are
determined by reality (current unemployment levels, current \realistic" wage
levels etc.) or by workers aspirations that may be in°uenced by out of date
variables (e.g. pre-shock wage levels). This is exactly what we set out to
measure in this paper.
2.3 Existing Empirical Evidence
Macroeconomists have estimated the relationship between wages and unem-
ployment using aggregate data since at least A. W. Philips' original speci-
¯cation of the curve that bears his name. Typically the relationship found
is between the level of unemployment and the change in the wage rate. At-
tempts to ¯nd a stable relationship between the level of unemployment and
the level of wages in aggregate data have generally failed 8 The functional
form that works is close to equation (4). Yet we know from the previous
discussion, that the relationship predicted by most theories of involuntary
unemployment is with the level of wages. Theory and macro-empirics can be
reconciled if we assume that reservation wages are equal to previous actual
wages (WR
t = Wt¡1)9. But this, as we have shown is quite an extreme case
from a theoretical point of view. We would expect that other variables would
impact on the reservation wage.
This macro-empirical regularity was challenged by Blanch°ower and Os-
wald (1994). They argued that the regressions using aggregate data were
misspeci¯ed because it involved a regression with a lagged dependent vari-
able in the presence of strongly autocorrelated disturbances. They argued
that this, and other, problems could be avoided if the relationship was esti-
matedusing regional level data. Doing so, they found that the autoregressive
coe±cient in the wage equation was close to zero. In other words they found
a strong, stable relationship between the level of wages and the level of un-
employment. This suggests that the reservation wage is primarily a function
of variables that re°ect current reality and that the impact of the previous
wage is minimal.
Card (1995), Card and Hyslop (1996) and Blanchard and Katz (1997),
all report that the Blanch°ower and Oswald results are not robust to small
8See for example, Blanchard's and Katz (1997) estimation of and Error Correction
Model for the US.
9In practice there would be a more complicated lag structure but the sum of the coef-
¯cients on the distributed lag of W would be approximately unity.
8changes in econometric speci¯cation. They show that alternative speci¯ca-
tions will tendto givea coe±cient on theprevious regional wage variable that
is close to one, thus supporting the traditional macroeconometric evidence.
One could argue that the apparent contradiction is not important. We
know from the sticky price literature (e.g. Caplin and Spulber[1987]) that
slowly adjusting prices at the macro level do not necessarily imply slowly
adjusting prices at the micro level and vice-versa. This kind of argument
couldbe used to reconcile the unit root in aggregate wage equations with less
extreme behaviour at the level of the individual. But this sort of argument
stretches credulity. If the aggregate data suggests that wages have a unit root
then it seems almost inescapable that individuals' reservation wages ought
to be heavily in°uenced by their lagged wages.
The contradictory empirical evidence serves to illustrate our ignorance
regarding the formation of reservation wages. In this paper we examine this
issue explicitly to see whether an individual's reservation wage is determined,
in part at least, by his own \lagged" wage i.e. the wage received in a previous
job. If the coe±cient is large, then we will ¯nd evidence of slow adjustment
to shocks at the micro level, supporting the macro empirical evidence that
wages have a unit root.
3 Econometric Speci¯cation
From the last section we know that basic idea is to run a regression with the
reservation wageas thedependent variableandvarious potential in°uenceson
reservation wages as regressors. Of particular interest to us is the possibility
that the reservation wage could be a function of the wage received during a
previous period of employment. In essence we will be estimating equation
such as (5) where, WR
it is the reservationwage ofperson i at time t, WL
it is the
individual's wage when last employed, F(Wit) is vector of su±cient statistics
for the distribution of wage o®ers, uit is (person speci¯c) unemployment rate,
and Xit is a vector of control variables.
lnW
R
it = ¯0 + ¯1lnW
L
it + ¯2lnF(Wit)+ ¯3lnuit + ¯4Xit + "it (5)
We choose the log-linear functional form so that the coe±cients may be in-
terpreted as elasticities. The control variables (Xit) include age, sex, number
of dependent children, asset income (ait) and the level of unemployment ben-
9e¯ts is bit.10 Note also that the previous wage is indexed by time t, not t¡1.
This conveys the idea that reservation wage formation is (potentially) back-
ward looking from time t. What matters is the size of the previous wage
viewed from time t, not necessarily when it was earned.11 Most of the time
WL
it will indeed equal Wit¡1, so but this will not be so if the individual has
been unemployed for more than one year.12
As discussed in section two, the reservation wage may change over time
as individuals adjust to the reality of the labour market. We allow for this
by including some measure of the current, person speci¯c, distribution of
wage o®ers, F(Wit) and a measure of the probability of receiving an o®er,
uit. This latter can be viewed as an individual speci¯c unemployment rate.
An individual will be more likely to turn down any job o®er if he feels he is
relatively likely to receive a better o®er sooner rather than later. The higher
the mean of the wage distribution, and the lower its variance, the more likely
is the individual to turn down a low wage o®er, hence the reservation wage
will be relatively high. Similarly, the lower the probability of remaining
unemployed, the higher the likely reservation wage.
In e®ect these variables are the counter-balance to the lagged wage vari-
able. Whereas WL
it represents history, now possibly economically irrelevant,
F(Wit) and uit represent economic reality (assuming that we can measure
them properly). Thus (5) is a regression of reservation wage on objective
reality and an individuals subjective perception of reality. We want to see
which is the more important determinant of reservation wages.
Before proceeding, we must comment on the relationship between this
paper and the public ¯nance literature that seeks the e®ect of unemployment
bene¯ts on labour market behavior. The classic example of this genre would
be Feldstein and Poterba (1984), while an example using British data is
Jones (1989). Essentially these authors regress the reservation wage on the
level of unemployment bene¯ts, controlling for the distribution ofwageo®ers.
Interestingly, they use the wage in the previous job as a proxy for the mean
of the current wage o®er distribution. This is valid on the assumption that
10We use actual asset income received (ait) as a regressor rather than the stock of wealth
or its change, because most individuals' savings tend to be held in illiquid forms such as
housing or pensions.
11In section 5 we examine whether the lagged wage e®ect diminishes with increasing
duration of unemployment.
12We use the superscript \L" to denote lagged wage. We use the terms \lagged wage"
and \previous wage" interchangeably.
10the distribution is stationary. But it also assumes that the lagged wage
contains no information that is not already present in the moments of the
wage o®er distribution. This is the diametrically opposite assumption to
ours. What we are interested in, is precisely the possibility that previous
wage could in°uence the reservation wage independently of the current wage
o®er distribution. This could be for many reasons. For example, it may
be the case that an individual believes that this wage indicates his value
to a previous employer and is, therefore, an indicator of his likely value
to a future employer. If he receives an o®er at a wage below his previous
wage, he may be inclined to think that this o®er is from the low end of the
distribution, and therefore reject it. In this case the lagged wage tells us
more about the individuals' subjective perception of the wage distribution
he faces rather than about the true wage distribution he actually does face.
Alternatively, pride may make any individual less likely to accept a job at a
wage lower than that earned in a previous employment, even if he is aware
that a better o®er is unlikely to arrive. We might expect both these e®ects
to diminish over time. As reality begins to bite, the individual may revise
down his wage expectations and swallow his pride. Either way, we want to
allow for the possibility that the lagged wage may in°uence the reservation
wage independently of the current o®er distribution.
One other relevant paper is Arulampalam et. al. (1998). Using the same
dataset as us (see below) they ¯nd that up to40% of the observed persistence
of unemployment is due to individuals' previous labour market experience
(the balance being due to spurious correlation caused by individual speci¯c
unobservable e®ects). Arulampalam et. al. (1998) conduct their analysis by
regressing employment status today on employment status in previous years.
In a sense their regression is the quantity analogue or our \price" regression.
4 Data
We conduct the analysis using a British dataset, the British Household Panel
Survey (BHPS).13 This panel covers 6 years from 1991-97.14 This dataset has
two particular advantages for us. Firstly, the data includes observations of
an individuals reservation wage. Secondly, as the data is a panel, we will
13For full details see Taylor (1996).
14During this period UK unemployment ranged from a minimum of 5:1% in 1997 to a
maximum of 10:4% in 1993.
11be able to control for individual speci¯c (unobserved) e®ects. As we explain
below, this is crucial. The major disadvantage of the data is that there are
relatively few observations. After elimination of missing values we are left
with 2;240 observations of individuals without employment. These observa-
tions consist of 1;215 distinct individuals (1101 men, 1200 women). We do
not observe every individual to be unemployed in each wave. The average
number of observations in the time dimension is 1:8 per individual. The
panel is highly unbalanced with some individuals observed to be unemployed
in each of the six waves, and many experiencing only one (observed) period
of unemployment. A total of 823 people experienced unemployment in two
or more waves of the panel.
Table 1 contains the de¯nitions and summary statistics of the variables
used in the analysis.15 All the monetary variables are in pounds sterling
per week and are de°ated by CPI in order to be in 1991 prices.16 The
human capital variables (educ, soc, pasoc) are all related to education and
occupation.
The reservation wage variable, WR
it , is the result of direct observation.
Individuals who reported that they did not have a job, but who said that
they would like one, were asked the following question:
\What is the lowest weekly take home pay you would consider
accepting for a job?"
We interpret the answer to this question as being the individual's reser-
vation wage after tax.17 We have observations of WR
it for individuals who
are unemployed and also for individuals who might be better described as
non-participants or discouraged workers. The di®erence is that the unem-
ployed reported that they had looked for a jobwithin the previous four week,
whereas the others reported, merely that they would \like" a job. The fact
that an individual said that he would like a job, and could suggest what sort
15The summary statistics are calculated for the pooled cross section.
16It is not clear a priori whether equation (5) should be expressed in nominal or real
terms. We tried both and found no signi¯cant di®erence. The results in the text are for
real variables.
17The use of the phrase \take home pay" means that the question would be understood
by the respondent torefer to the after tax wage. Tax illusion may cause problems, however.
It is not clear whether, for example, individuals answered this question by ¯rst calculating
a gross wage and applying some arbitrarily chosen tax rate or whether there preferences
over alternative labor market states were already paramaterized in terms of net wages.
12of job it might be, was su±cient for him to be asked the question quoted
above.18
We acknowledge the potential objection that the answer to this question
may not accord exactly with the theoretical concept of the reservation wage.
Individuals may have little incentive to give an honest answer. Also there is
the possibility that the ordering of the questions in survey may have led to
some confusion.
As regards the honesty of the replies, this is a potential problem in all
surveys. Two facts lead us to trust the answers in this survey. Firstly,
the respondents knew that the survey was con¯dential. In particular they
knew that the information they gave was not to be made available to tax
and welfare authorities. Secondly, elsewhere in the survey many individuals
who were receiving state unemployment bene¯ts reported that they were not
actively searching for work. This is despite the fact that active search is
supposedly a requirement for receipt of those bene¯ts. This suggests that
respondents believed that survey was con¯dential.
The issue of the ordering of the question is more problematic. Before
being asked the \reservation wage" question, individuals were ¯rst asked
to specify the occupation that they \expected" to get. It is possible that
they interpreted the subsequent \reservation wage" question as referring to
the lowest wage for which they would accept that occupation, as distinct
from the lowest wage they would accept for some arbitrary job. If there is
some variance in the precise interpretation of this question, we believe that
its answer is still indicative of an individuals relative willingness to leave
unemployment. More formally, if there is an error in the WR variable, there
is no reason to expect that it is correlated with any of the regressors in (5).
Least squares on (5) will still produce consistent estimates.
The wage in the last job, WL, is calculated as the net weekly wage re-
ceived in the most recent spell of employment. For many, but not all the
unemployed, this is equal to the wage reported at a previous wave of the
panel i.e. WL
it = Wis where s < t. For the rest the variable is calculated
from the answers individuals gave to a series of questions about their labour
market activities between the current and previous waves of the panel.19 On
18The variable search in Table 1 shows that 54% of those providing a reservation wage
satis¯ed the OECD's de¯nition of involuntary unemployment i.e. actively searched for a
job last month.
19The dataset contains detailed information on respondents labour market behaviour
between waves. In principle, every time period is accounted for. See Halpin (1997) for a




The bene¯ts variable is the level of state bene¯ts the respondent reported
receiving at time of interview. This may be di®erent form thelevel ofbene¯ts
to which the individual is entitled. We do not investigate the issue of bene¯t
take up rates any further. Not all the bene¯ts available are formally linked
to employment status. Most of the bene¯ts, however, are means tested.
Therefore they are likely to vary with employment status. It is also worth
noting that the size of unemployment bene¯ts are not linked to the wage
received when last employed. About 26% of the observations in the sample
are of zero bene¯ts. We treat these individuals $0:25 in bene¯ts per week in
order to avoid taking logs of zero.21
We can use two alternative procedures to account for the e®ect of the
probability of receiving o®ers. The ¯rst method is to proxy the probability
by the regional unemployment rates, in the spirit of Blanch°ower & Oswald
(1994). We would expect that a high unemployment rate would make the
unemployed less likely to turn down a job o®er even at a low wage, for fear
that a better o®er is unlikely to materialize in reasonable time.
Card (1995) notes that this method su®ers from the problem that there
are relatively few independent observations of the regional level data. As our
sample in already small, there may be insu±cient variability in the unem-
ployment variable to identify an e®ect, even if it exists. Therefore we adopt
an alternative approach. We construct an individual speci¯c unemployment
rate. We ¯rst estimate a probit model of employment on a sample consisting
of all the employed and unemployed in the BHPS dataset. The independent
variables in this model are regional unemployment rates, individual charac-
teristics such as age, education (educ), occupation group (soc, pasoc) and
region and time dummies and their interactions. The dependent variable is
the individual's current reported employment status. We use (one minus)
the predicted probability from this probit model as a regressor in (5).22 The
idea is that this variable represents the probability that an arbitrary indi-
detailed discussion of this aspect of the BHPS.
20The standard deviation of this ratio is 1:6 and the median is 0:88. Jones (1989) reports
a mean and standard deviation of 1:05 and 0:5 respectively. Feldstein and Poterba (1984)
report a mean of 1:07.
21We alsoapplied this adjustment to the asset income variable. About 35% of individuals
did not report any asset income.
22The detailed results of this probit are available on request.
14vidual with the same characteristics as person i will get a job conditional on
him searching.23 This procedure can be thought of as being a generalization
of the Blanch°ower & Oswald (1994) idea of using the unemployment rate
for i0s region as a regressor in wage equations. It goes some way towards
meeting the Card (1995) objection that there is insu±cient variation in the
regional unemployment variable.
We approximate F(Wit), the person speci¯c distribution of wages, by its
mean We have two potential measures of the mean of the distribution of
wage o®ers. The ¯rst, direct measure, is We
it, the individual's response to the
question:
\What weekly take home wage would you expect to get?"
There is anobvious problems withinterpretingtheanswer tothis question
as it is not clear whether the expectation is conditional on the o®er being
acceptable i.e. the o®ered wage being greater than the reservation wage,
E(WitjWit > WR
it ). We want the unconditional mean of the distribution,
¹ Wit.24 In any case, We
it, may not be the appropriate variable. By its very
nature it is subjective. What we want is a measure of the potential wage
o®ers that the individual actually faces. In our setup the subjectivity is
captured by the lagged wage variable.
We could estimate a measure of the variance of wages and use this to
construct the unconditional mean from We
it. But it seems simpler to esti-
mate the mean of the distribution directly, especially given the subjectivity
of We
it. In order to construct ^ Wit, an alternative measure of the mean of the
distribution of o®ered wages, we ¯rst estimate a standard wage equation on
a sample consisting of all the employed. We regress the weekly net wage on
regional unemployment rates, individual characteristics such as age, educa-
tion (educ), occupation group (soc, pasoc) and region and time dummies
and their interactions. We correct for sample selection using the two stage
procedure of Heckman (1979). The ¹ R2 in the wage equation is 0:23 and the
23The probabilty is conditional on searching because we estimate the probit model on a
sample consisting of the employed and the unemployed, but not the non-participants. We
then construct the predicted probabilty for both the unemployed and the non-participants,
as we observe reservation wage for both groups.
24In this data set W e is less than W R in only 2% of cases. The two are equal in 33% of
cases and W e is greater than W R in 65% of cases. This suggests that W e is the conditional
mean.
15coe±cient on the inverse mills ratio is ¡0:88 with a standard error of 0:07.25
We then use the coe±cients from this regression to calculate ¯tted values
for those who do not have a job. We interpret these ¯tted values, ^ Wit, as
being the mean of the distribution of wage o®ers that an individual faces,
conditional on his characteristics and the characteristics of the local labour
market.
This procedure has the advantage that it is not open to the kind of prob-
lems of interpretation that undermine our con¯dence in We
it. But there are
three problems with it. Firstly the ¯tted values were created via a regression
of the wage on dummies derived from the human capital variables together
with interactions between time and region dummies. Only the exogeneity
of fathers occupation (pasoc), age and the time dummies are absolutely
assured. One could argue that the human capital variables and even the
regional dummies are all the result of choices that are made jointly with the
choice of labour market status and are therefore not exogenous.26
It can be argued, however, that, while these variables are formally the
result of choices, those choices are su±ciently independent of the choice of
employment status to enable the resulting variables to be treated as exoge-
nous in practice. For example, education may be thought to be endogenous
because we choose a higher level of education in anticipation that this will
enable us to earn higher wages, avoid unemployment etc. But it is also plau-
sible to suggest that the choice of education is as much a result of available
opportunities, parental encouragement, personal abilities etc. To the extent
that this is so, the level of education can be considered to be exogenous.
More precisely, most of the individuals in this dataset who are forming their
reservation wage will probably not be considering returning to formal edu-
cation. From their point of view the in°uence of education on the mean of
the distribution of wage o®ers is ¯xed.27
A third problem with the Heckman (1979) procedure relates to the speci-
¯cation of the selection probit. Ideally we would like to exclude variable from
the selection probit in order to identify the mills ratio in the wage equation.
Without exclusion restrictions, the mills ratio is identi¯ed only by functional
form i.e. the assumption that the errors are jointly normally distributed. Un-
fortunately, in this application there are no reasonable exclusion restrictions.
25The results of this regression are available on request.
26See Harmon and Walker (1997) for evidence of the endogeneity of schooling in the
UK.
27Arulampalam et. al. (1998) use analagous reasoning in their quantity regressions.
16Any variable that can be hypothesized to determine whether an o®er will
be received will most likely also a®ect the wage received. For this reason,
we estimated the Heckman model without exclusion restrictions. Opinion
is divided over whether this is acceptable. Vella (1998), however, reports
Monte Carlo simulations that suggest that identifying by functional from is
better than imposing unreasonable exclusion restrictions. In addition, we ex-
perimented with several alternative sets of (admittedly arbitrary) exclusion
restrictions. The main results of the paper (the coe±cients on ^ Wit and WL
it)
were una®ected.
The third, and most serious, problem is that this procedure may render
OLS estimates of (5) inconsistent. Replacing ¹ Wit with ^ Wit introduces the
term ¹ Wit ¡ ^ Wit into the residual of the estimated equation. This term will,
almost surely, have an individual speci¯c component ¹i: This represents that
component of the expected wage that is speci¯c to the individual and is not
correlated with the observed characteristics that were used to construct ^ Wit.
The actual model estimated will have the form (6).
lnW
R
it = ¯0 + ¯1lnW
L
it +¯2ln ^ Wit +¯3lnuit +¯4Xit + ¹i +"it (6)
It is probably the case that WL
it will be positively correlated with ¹i, because
WL
it, the wage received in the previous job, will probably have been a®ected
by the individual speci¯cunobservable. Thus OLS estimationof(6) will yield
upward biased estimates of the e®ect of WL
it on reservation wages. It was for
this reason that Feldstein and Poterba (1984) and Jones (1989) rejected the
use of a ¯ttedvalue as an estimate of the mean of the wage o®er distribution.
They opted instead to use WL
it as a proxy for ¹ Wit. This is not an optionfor us
as we are interested in the possibility that WL
it has an independent in°uence
on the reservation wage. We need to include both variables in the regression
and we need a method to combat the bias introduced by the unobservable
component.
In order to combat the problem we tried to instrument for the lagged
wage using ¯rm size and industry e®ects. For this procedure to be valid, we
need that the industry and ¯rm size be correlated with WL
it but uncorrelated
with ¹i. The ¯rst of these requirements is easy to accept, but the latter
is not. Even at the three digit level, the probability that an unemployed
individual has exactly the same code on reemployment, as the most recent
previous job, is 34%: To the extent that unemployed individuals are more
likely to get a job in the same industry or similarly sized ¯rm, the industry
17and size will be correlated with ¹i and they will not be valid instruments.28
The alternative to IV is to make use of the panel aspect of the data.
We should be able to di®erence out the individual e®ect using the ¯xed
e®ects or \within groups" estimator.29 In fact we could have a great deal
of con¯dence in the ¯xed e®ects estimator. It will solve the problem of
the individual unobservable provided we are prepared to assume that the
observable is constant over time. There is, however, a problem. We can
apply the ¯xed e®ects estimator only to those individuals who experienced
two or more periods of unemployment during the sample period.30 This
has the immediate e®ect of reducing the sample size, with likely adverse
consequences for the signi¯cance of results. More importantly, it raises an
issue of sample selection. We might expect that those who experience several
periods of unemployment would have systematically di®erent labour market
behaviour than those who experience only one spell of unemployment over a
period of several years. It is not clear which way this bias goes. Which group
is more likely to focus on its previous wage? Those who are unemployed only
once? Or those who experience periods of unemployment regularly? If it is
the former group that relies on the lagged wage the most, then ¯xed e®ects
procedure, by excluding them, will tend to underestimate the signi¯cance
of the lagged wage for the population as a whole. The results must be
interpreted with this caveat in mind.
5 Empirical Results
We report the OLS estimates of equation (5) in Table 2. At this point, no
attempt is made to account for the panel nature of the data, all waves are
pooled together as if from one cross section. Furthermore, the regressions in
columns 1to 4use asample made upof bothmenandwomen. Columns5 and
6 perform the analysis on both gender groups separately. In addition to the
variables shown in the table, all regressions also include a cubic polynomial
in age of respondent and the number of dependent children. These variables
28The IV results are available on request. They are very similar to the IV results of
Jones (1989) who used education as the instrument.
29The \random e®ects" (GLS) estimator would su®er from the same inconsistency prob-
lem as the OLS estimator.
30Recall that out of 1;215 individuals, 823 experience unemployment in two or more
periods.
18are of no particular interest and so are omitted from the tables for clarity.
The ¯rst column shows the estimates of (5) when ¹ Wit, the mean of the
distribution of o®ered wages is proxied by We
it, the individuals subjective
expectation of future wages. The coe±cient on the expected wage variable,
We
it is large and highly signi¯cant. In fact this variable alone explains most of
the variation in the dependent variable, WR
it . The R2 at 0:85 is extraordinary
high for a cross section wage regression. The coe±cients on the \wage in the
previous job" variable, WL
it, and on the bene¯ts variable, bit, are small but
statistically signi¯cant. The coe±cient on asset income ait, is signi¯cant but
incorrectly signed.
The size of the coe±cient on We
it leads us to suspect that this variable
may not truly capture the mean of the distribution of wage o®ers. It could
be the case that individuals, when asked what they expect to earn, give as
their answer a wage equal to their reservation wage plus 15%, for example.
This sort of behavior generates a spurious correlation between the dependent
variable WR
it and the regressor We
it. This would explain the unusually high
R2: Alternatively, if We
it is the conditional mean, E[WjW > WR], then




In order to avoid these problems, we present, in column two of Table
2, the estimates of (5) with We
it replaced by ^ Wit, the ¯tted value from a
wage regression. If We
it measures the mean of the wage distribution, then
the results in the ¯rst two columns of table 2 should not be signi¯cantly
di®erent. The coe±cient on ^ Wit is signi¯cantly lower than the coe±cient on
We
it. The ¹ R2 for this regression is less than half that of column 1. This leads
us to suspect that the estimates using We
it are contaminated by a spurious
correlation and therefore the use of ^ Wit is to be preferred. For purposes the
most important di®erence between columns one and two is that the point
estimate of the e®ect of WL
it has risen by a factor of 6. Even so, it is still
muchlower than what we might have anticipated from the macroeconometric
evidence.31
Surprisingly, the e®ect of the regional unemployment rate is insigni¯cant.
This could indicate that local unemployment rates have no direct e®ect on
reservation wages, perhaps only in°uencing reservation wages indirectly via
31Jones (1989) found a signi¯cant coe±cient of 0:24 on the previous wage and a statis-
tically insigni¯cant coe±cient of 0:03 on bene¯ts. His regression was similar to ours with
the exception that he did not include the ¯tted value ^ Wit
19an e®ect on the distribution of wage o®ers. It may be, however, a manifesta-
tion of the problem of insu±cient variation discussed in the last section and
by Card (1995). The number of independent observations of Urt is only 57
and, from Table 1, we can see that the variance is small. This may not be
su±cient to identify an e®ect even if one exists.
We re-estimate equation (5) with the regional variable, Urt replaced by
^ Uit, our constructed individual speci¯c unemployment rate. These estimates
are presented in the third column of Table 2. The coe±cients on all the
variables are virtually unchanged from those of column 2. The ¹ R2 is similarly
unchanged. Note that the coe±cient on the unemployment variable is still
incorrectly signed and statistically insigni¯cant.
The coe±cient on asset income in all the ¯rst four columns seems to be
incorrectly signed but signi¯cant. We would expect that higher asset income
would lead to a higher reservation wage. An individual with more savings
can a®ord to be a more choosey regarding any jobs o®ers that he might
receive. The negative coe±cient could be explained by a spurious correlation
caused by the intertemporal nature of savings. Those who have relatively
high savings would tend to be those with less experience of unemployment
through time. And those with relatively low reservation wages would, ceteris
paribus, tend to experience less unemployment. Thus the regression could
pick up the e®ect of previous unemployment on asset accumulation rather
than the e®ect of assets on labour market behaviour.
We next consider the possibility that there is multicolinearity between
the wage in previous job and the mean of the distribution. This could be the
case if the wage in the last job is drawn from the distribution which has ¹ Wit
as its mean i.e. if the wage distributionis stationary. Both variables could be
pickingupthee®ect of personal characteristics onthereservationwage evenif
previous employment per se had no e®ect on the reservation wage. Therefore
we re-estimated the regression excluding the lagged wage variable. These
results are presented in the fourth column of Table 2. These results should
be compared with those in column 3 of Table 2, where the regressors are
identical but for the inclusion of WL
it. The coe±cient on ^ Wit, the constructed
mean of the distribution of wage o®ers, has risen and is signi¯cantly di®erent
from that in column 3. The other variables are also signi¯cantly a®ected.
This suggests that there is some degree of positive collinearity between WL
it
and ^ Wit. Nevertheless, the wage received in the previous job does appear to
exert an independent in°uence on the formation of reservation wages.
Finally, it is useful to see if the e®ect of previous employment is di®er-
20ent for men and for women. In columns 5 and 6 of Table 2 we report the
estimates of the model where the full sample is split into two sub-samples,
one consisting of men only and the other consisting of women only. All the
variables are the same with the exception of the two ¯tted values (^ Uit and
^ Wit) which are now calculated from ¯rst stage regressions on single sex sam-
ples. The results are not that di®erent from the pooled sample. But it does
seem that the lagged wage matters less, and the market wage matters more,
to women than to men. On re°ection, this is not too surprising, women are
often thought to have more °exible labour market behaviour.
As explained in the last section, we might expect that OLS estimation
of (5) is inconsistent because WL
it is correlated with the residual when ^ Wit
is a regressor due to the likely presence of an individual speci¯c unobserved
component to wages. The e®ect of this inconsistency is to bias the coe±cient
on the lagged wage upwards. So we can treat the estimate of this coe±cient
reportedincolumns 3, 5 and 6 as upper bounds onthe truevalues. Astriking
implication of this observation is that the true coe±cient must be very low.
Certainly it is much lower than unity.
We present the ¯xed e®ects results in the ¯rst column of Table 3. These
are quite di®erent from the OLS estimates. The ¯xed e®ects estimate of the
coe±cient on WL
it is substantially lower than in the OLS case. This is not
surprising, as OLS is probably biased upward. As noted earlier, it is pos-
sible that the ¯xed e®ects estimate is biased downwards, because of sample
selection. . In an attempt to asses the direction and degree of any bias,
we estimate OLS on a sub-sample of those who experienced unemployment
in two or more waves of the panel. These estimate were not signi¯cantly
di®erent from OLS on the whole sample. In any case, the striking result is
that this value is much lower than unity.Even if the ¯xed e®ects estimate is
biased downwards we can view it as being a lower bound for the true value-
Combining this with OLS upper bound we have a range for the true value of
the coe±cient of (0:15;0:25)| much less than unity.
The coe±cient on the expected future wage is signi¯cant, but only half
the size of the OLS estimate. It is not obvious why the presence of individual
speci¯c error term should have biased the OLS estimate of this coe±cient
upwards. As in the OLS case, the coe±cient on the bene¯ts variable is
correctly signed, signi¯cant but surprisingly small in magnitude. A doubling
of bene¯ts would lead to an increase in the reservation wage of only 1:5%.
Thecoe±cientonthe individual speci¯c unemployment rateis also signi¯cant
and correctly signed. Curiously it is almost exactly equal to 0:1, the value
21obtained by Blanch°ower and Oswald (1994). Although in their case the
regression was of market wages on regional unemployment rate. Finally, note
that the coe±cient on asset income is now positive (although insigni¯cant).
This suggests that the OLS estimator does indeed su®er from a spurious
correlation brought on by the link between savings and employment over
time. The ¯xed e®ects estimator takes account of this dynamic relationship.
Again we break down the analysis by sex in columns two and three of
Table 3. Unlike in the case of the OLS estimates, there appears to be no
signi¯cant di®erence between the two groups.
As a robustness check, it is useful to see if the e®ect of previous employ-
ment diminishes with the duration of unemployment. In columns 4 and 5
of Table 3 we report the estimates of the model where the sample is split
into two sub-samples, one consisting of those out of work for 12 months or
less and one consisting of those out of work for more than on year.32 The re-
sults are pretty striking.33 For the recently unemployed, the objective market
wage (i.e. the estimated mean of the distribution) has basically no impact on
the formation of reservation wages. The wage received in the previous job,
however, has a signi¯cant a®ect on reservation wages. But the coe±cient is
much less than unity. The situation is reversed for those who have been out
of work for more than a year. The wage in the previous job now has zero
impact on the reservation wage. The mean of the distribution, on the other
hand, has a large, and signi¯cant, impact on this groups reservation wages.
This result is robust to changes in the sample split. If we split the sample at
6, 18 or 24 months duration, we get the same pattern of results. The lagged
wage matters more to those with the shorter duration and the market wage
to those with the longer duration. The di®erence is most stark, however,
when the sample is split at 12 months.
Finally one last robustness check. We experiment including various extra
variables in (6).34 Inclusion of human capital, demographic variables and
regional dummies reduce the signi¯cance of the coe±cients on ^ Wit and ^ Uit,
which is not surprising given their construction. The coe±cient on WL
it;
32Duration here is measured as the time elapsed since the previous wage was last earned.
This may not be exactly the same as duration of unemployment, if people have moved
between unemployment and non-participation.
33A caveat: we have ignored the possibility of simultaneous relationship beween duration
and unemployment.
34In the interests of brevity, the results of this data mining are not reported here. They
are available on request.
22however, remains remarkably robust. No amount of tortures in°icted upon
the data can get it depart signi¯cantly from 0:15. The only exception was
when We
it was included as a regressor. As explained earlier, there are good
reasons not to include this variable in any of the regressions.
6 Conclusions
This paper set out to ¯nd the determinants of the reservation wage and to
indicate what the structure of reservation wages implies for the evolution of
the natural rate of unemployment. We ¯nd that the wage in a previous job
and the expected future wage are all important determinants of the reser-
vation wage (with elasticities of 0:15 and 0:3 respectively). Surprisingly,
we ¯nd that unemployment rates and the level of bene¯ts,have only a small
e®ect on reservation wages (elasticities of ¡0:1 and 0: ¡ 0:015 respectively).
Our results are clear, and appear robust to a number of alternative spec-
i¯cations. The central result of the paper is the e®ect of the wage in the
previous job on reservation wages. At 0:15; our preferred estimate of this
coe±cient is surprisingly low. Even if we doubt the accuracy of this (¯xed
e®ects) estimate, we can reason that the true value must lie somewhere be-
tween it and the OLS estimate (0:25). This entire range is quite low. Most
importantly it is much lower than unity, the value suggested by evidence
from aggregate wage data. Thus our results seem to contradict some of the
macroeconometric evidence on wage determination.
This result suggests that the reservation wage will adjust to any shock
relatively quickly. The coe±cients on the variables that re°ect current real-
ity, the level of bene¯ts and the expected future wage, are larger than the
coe±cient on the historic variable, the wage in the previous job. This in turn
implies that the natural rate of unemployment will adjust relatively quickly
to shocks.
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25Table 1: The BHPS Data
Variable De¯nition Mean Variance
age age at interview 37.73 13.31
bit bene¯ts received (per week) 37.28 39.77
WR
it reservation wage (per week) 93.93 63.34
ait investment income (per week) 3.8 14.2
We
it expected wage (per week) 119.69 88.82
^ Wit constructed mean wage (per week) 178.92 58.94
WL
it wage in previous job (per week) 113.71 83.06
Urt Regional unemloyment. rate 8.51 2.12
rate f female regional unemployment rate 4.53 1.09
rate m male regional unemployment rate 11.57 2.98
^ Uit individual unemployment rate 9.83 7.64
length time since WL
it recorded (in months) 16.42 15.9
educ level of education (0-6, 6=Masters/PhD 1.73 1.59
0= no academic quali¯cations
1=basic secondary school)
search \actively searched" for a job during past month 0.54 0.49
kids number of dependent children 0.81 1.04
tae terminal age of education 17.56 4.35
soc occupation code (1-9, 9 highest skill group) 5.72 2.3
pasoc father's occupation (1-9, 9 highest skill group) 3.7 1.3
white ethnic background (=1 if white) 0.96 0.19
sex sex (=1 if male) 0.52 0.49
1. Statistics are calculated for the pooled cross sectionTable 2: OLS Estimation
Dependent Variable: lnWR
it
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)2 (6)2
Sample All All All All Male Female
lnWL
it 0.042 0.252 0.253 - 0.205 0.16
(0.008) (0.018) (0.018) - (0.026) (0.025)
lnbit 0.010 0.022 0.022 0.024 0.025 0.037
(0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.01)
ln ^ Wit - 0.743 0.746 0.999 0.437 0.647
- (0.035) (0.035) (0.026) (0.09) (0.06)
lnWe
it 0.887 - - - - -
(0.008) - - - - -
lnUrt -0.001 0.073 - - - -
(0.021) (0.048) - - - -
ln^ Uit - - 0.009 0.003 -0.045 0.064
- - (0.018) (0.015) (0.026) (0.032)
lnait -0.017 -0.025 -0.024 -0.029 -0.008 -0.021
(0.004) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.011) (0.014)
N 3069 2301 2301 3862 1101 1200
¹ R2 0.85 0.38 0.38 0.31 0.30 0.22
1. Standard errors are in parentheses
2. The ¯tted regressors (^ Uit and ^ Wit) are calculated separately for each sub-sample.
3. All regressions also include a constant, cubic in age and number of dependent children





Male Female ￿ 12 months > 12 months
lnWL
it 0.147 0.142 0.136 0.140 0.078
(0.046) (0.061) (0.067) (0.047) (0.146)
lnbit 0.015 0.007 0.032 0.018 0.016
(0.009) (0.010) (0.017) (0.012) (0.020)
ln ^ Wit 0.314 0.464 0.473 0.046 0.443
(0.104) (0.208) (0.145) (0.151) (0.198)
ln^ Uit -0.096 -0.052 0.002 -0.099 -0.059
(0.042) (0.049) (0.073) (0.068) (0.073)
lnait 0.009 0.005 0.017 -0.032 0.047
(0.017) (0.02) (0.029) (0.028) (0.032)
N 561 260 301 190 246
¹ T 2.9 3.0 2.8 2.3 2.7
R2 0.27 0.13 0.26 0.28 0.21
1. Standard errors are in parentheses
2. The ¯tted regressors (^ Uit and ^ Wit) are calculated separately for each sample
3. All regressions also include a constant, cubic in age and number of dependent children
28